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“Recollection, Retribution, and Restoration:  
American Civil War Prison Policy in  
Union and Confederate Prisoner-of-War Memory.” 
 
 Over a hundred and thirty eight years have passed since Robert E. Lee’s 
surrender at Appomattox Court House and yet the Civil War continues to live in 
American historiography.  Despite David Herbert Donald’s announcement in the 
early 1960s that Civil War history was dead, historians have continued the 
campaign.  Over the past four decades historians have advanced the standard of 
research on several historiographic fronts: gender and race issues, sectional 
party allegiances, the economy and home front in the Union and the Confederacy, 
military leadership, strategy, and tactics, foreign diplomacy, and the impact of 
industry and technology on soldiers and society.  From all of the aforementioned, 
there emerges and increasingly clearer portrait of the people, places, and 
episodic events that form the very bedrock of contemporary fascination with the 
war.  Yet despite all of the innovation and erudition, historians have written 
little on an equally important and highly contentious subject: the Civil War 
prisoner-of-war system.  It was a system that claimed the lives of thousands of 
men and forever changed the political and ideological perception of those who 
survived to tell about it.1  
                                                 
     1 For a snapshot of present Civil War historiography through the end of the 
twentieth century and the areas in need of further mining see James M. McPherson 
and William J. Cooper, Jr., Eds., Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand 
(Columbia, South Carolina, 1998); A select sampling for further investigation may 
also include: pioneer and Civil War history master David H. Donald’s, Charles 
Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1960) and The Nation in Crisis 
1861-1877 (New York, 1969); For gender issues see Catherine Clinton, Divided 
Houses: Gender and the Civil War (New York, 1992), or Elizabeth D. Leonard, All 
the Daring of A Soldier: Women of the Civil War Armies (New York, 1999), or Karen 
Zeinert, Those Courageous Women of the Civil War (Brookfield, Conn., 1998); For 
the African-American experience see John David Smith, Black Soldiers in Blue: 
African-American Troops in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2002), 
or Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black 
Soldiers and White Officers (New York, 1990), or Emory M. Thomas The Old South in 
the Crucible of War: Essays (Jackson, Mississippi, 1983); For politics and 
economy see Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of 
Slavery, Emancipation and the American Civil War (New York, 1989), or Michael F. 
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Because former as well as recently emerging literature on the American Civil 
War prison system has bent toward specific case studies of individual camps and 
conditions, the objective of this study includes the institutional perspective of 
prison policy in order to form a combined recollection of the system.  By 
combining the soldier’s perspective with that of the policy-makers, a more 
transparent image emerges and enables us to better differentiate myth from 
reality.  Results indicate that late-war camp conditions were more of a byproduct 
of inconsistent early war policy directives, including friction between central 
and state governments, and less the result of inadequate care or intentional 
mistreatment as maintained by some veterans, preachers, and politicians.2   
Because United States foreign policy was predicated upon neutralizing any 
foreign belligerent or de facto recognition of the South, the Lincoln 
administration logically avoided any cartel or exchange agreement, an act that 
would have been a form of belligerent recognition in and of itself.  The North 
only acceded to a conditional exchange policy after Southern de facto recognition 
was achieved, because of the blockade, and whenever a majority of prisoners were 
held by the South.  Political expediency, therefore, dictated prison policy.   
With the question of de facto recognition remaining at an impasse well into 
the first year of the war, neither the United States nor Confederate governments 
developed an effective means for dealing with prisoners-of-war in any form of 
proactive manner.  The governmental policy delays, therefore, caused logistical 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Holt, Political Parties and American Political Development: From the Age of 
Jackson to the Age of Lincoln (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1992), or David W. Blight, 
Union and Emancipation: Essays on Politics and Race in the Civil War Era (Kent, 
Ohio, 1997); For Leadership see Gary W. Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in War 
and Memory (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1998), or Grady McWhiney, Grant, Lee, 
Lincoln, and The Radicals: Essays on Civil War Leadership (Evanston, Illinois, 
1964); For diplomacy see Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, The United States 
and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1970), or Brian 
Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union (Montreal, McGill-Queens University 
Press, 1974), or James D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States 
(New York, 1959). 
     2  To crudely illustrate a point: An Amazon.com search under “books” for “Civil 
War Prisons” yields one hundred and eight results alone; all of which deal 
specifically with individual camps or episodes like Andersonville, Elmira, Libby, 
the Sultana Disaster, et al. A definitive volume dealing specifically with prison 
policy is yet to be written.    
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problems for both sides: who should pay for it in the North, and how to pay for 
it in the South.  Logistical concerns, coupled by an ever-changing geographical 
and geopolitical landscape, caused further policy delays.  Because of the delays 
both governments were accused, at home and across the battle lines, of 
premeditated mistreatment.  The perception on the part of the prisoners with 
respect to their governments’ apparent lack of empathy, then, is what exacerbated 
much of the pejorative post-war rhetoric and recrimination; rhetoric and 
recrimination utilized for political, and at times, personal gain both inside and 
outside the federal and state legislative assemblies.3  
The apparent lack of governmental empathy is best illustrated in the 
prisoner’s shared belief that they were held in captivity, without hope of 
exchange, in order to reduce their ranks by disease.  Yet despite the personal 
reproaches of the prisoners, wartime policy, rather than an intentional 
withholding of supplies, led to their demise.  Ulysses S. Grant reluctantly 
affirmed the priority of military policy—one of necessity—when he said, “It is 
hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity 
to those left in our ranks to fight our battles.”4  Irrespective of Grant’s words 
or the reality of military and political decision-making, the prisoner’s personal 
accounts, shaped largely by what they actually believed to be true, would have a 
lasting and motivating impact, and thus would serve as harbingers for all 
subsequent sectional polemics. In short, this paper argues that the lack of 
                                                 
     3 James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston, 1937); Ovid L. 
Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Gainesville, Florida, 1968); William Best 
Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology (New York, 1958) see 
esp. pages 1-39; Lonnie Speer, Portals to Hell: Military Prisons of the Civil War 
(Mechanicsville, Virginia, 1997). For international legal considerations, albeit 
cursory, see Richard S. Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (Chicago, 
Ill., 1983), 9, 43-44; James McPherson “Lincoln and the Strategy of Unconditional 
Surrender,” in Lincoln, The War President, (New York, 1992), 43; and Mark 
Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, (Cambridge, 1995), 10-13. Francis L. Ludes and 
Harold J. Gilbert, eds., Corpus Juris Secundum: A Complete Restatement of the 
Entire American Law, 101 Vols. (Brooklyn, New York, 1956), 93, 12; U.S. Supreme 
Court Reports of the United States, Lawyers ed., 118 Vols. (Rochester, New York, 
1917-1967), 17, The Prize Cases, 459.   
     4 War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, 73 Vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Ser. II, Vol. VII, 
605-607 (hereinafter cited as O.R.). 
 4
consistent prison policies, most a byproduct of the changing goals and the 
unexpected duration of the war, in Washington (and to a lesser degree in 
Richmond), as well as interference by state governments, created the misery of 
the emaciated.  The memories of the emaciated, then, impacted postwar rhetoric 
and retarded reunion.5   
  
For years before and after Robert E. Lee moved his army toward Appomattox Court 
House, the general public and politicians in both sections tirelessly rekindled 
the recriminatory rhetoric that would come to surround the prisoner-of-war 
system.  Union and Confederate soldiers, politicians, and veterans used the 
system’s ghastly aura--for personal and political reasons--to strengthen and 
sustain sectional animosity.  Whether for monetary or political gain, veterans, 
aided by some legislators eager to raise their own political capital, often 
embellished accounts of their imprisonment on pension applications.  Politicians 
too would wave the bloody shirt with their incendiary rhetoric regarding the 
treatment of their captured citizens, soldiers, and sailors in order to solidify 
home-front support during the war, and to exacerbate political animosity after 
the war.6 
 In a 1916 speech Bennett H. Young, a former Confederate prisoner of war at 
Camp Chase in Ohio, ably illuminated that which had aided the false consciousness 
of the public regarding recriminatory and sectional party rhetoric.  He said that 
“much of the bitterness between the North and the South during and since the war 
grew out of the treatment of prisoners.. . . It suited the purposes of the 
‘bloody shirt’ element to exaggerate every possible circumstance in order to 
embitter the people of the North against the people of the South . . . [so as to 
                                                 
     5 William Best Hesseltine, “The Propaganda Literature of Confederate Prisons,” 
Journal of Southern History 1(1935):56-66; Nancy A. Roberts, “The Aftermath of 
Civil War Prisons and Their Dead,” University of Oregon, 1996, DA9714504, May, 
1997.  
     6 Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 1st Session, 29 Jan. 1872, 692. For pensions 
see Maris A. Vinovskis, “Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some 
Preliminary Demographic Speculations,” Journal of American History, 76 (1989), 
55. On veterans who were politicians see Gerald W. McFarland and Katzuto Oshio, 
“Civil War Service and Loyalty to the Republican Party; 1884,” Historical Journal 
of Massachusetts, 15 (1987), 170-172.   
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give] the party then in power lengthened control of the government.”7  Young 
therefore, maintained that some politicians were willing to manipulate sources--
bend ethical principle--in order to meet political practicality.   
From the three-score years that preceded Bennett’s comments, there emerged a 
literary effusion of articles, expositions, and anecdotes about prisons.  
Veterans from the North and South were uniformly convinced “that their jailors 
had subjected them to treatment heinously designed to reduce their ranks by 
starvation and disease.”8  Moreover, ex-prisoners called into question, some in 
published form, the leaders and policies that had created and protracted their 
time in the valley of the shadow.  Thus despite what Bennett held to be true in 
the twentieth century, few veterans believed to be true in the immediate postwar 
period of the nineteenth century. 
The first published accounts of prison life in the South appeared in the 
late summer of 1862 following the exchange agreement between opposing 
governments.  The initial accounts were written to incite a public outcry against 
the inhumane treatment of soldiers by southern “barbarians.”  Yet because the 
very nature of an uninterrupted exchange reduced the overall time that 
individuals were held in captivity, the original published accounts failed to 
produce much response, humanitarian or otherwise, in the North.9 
When autumn approached a year later in 1863, however, Union policy regarding 
the cartel changed, and the exchange was halted.  The Lincoln administration 
attributed their suspension of the cartel to several factors: the South’s refusal 
                                                 
     7 Bennett H. Young, “Address at Columbus, Ohio, June 10, 1916 on the decoration 
of the graves of Confederate soldiers at Camp Chase,” Confederate Veteran, 24 
(August 1916), 348-352. 
     8 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 56-57; New York Times, Aug. 1, 21, Oct. 3, 1865. 
     9  On July 12, 1862 Major Generals John A. Dix (U.S) and Daniel Harvey Hill 
(C.S.), acting under orders from George Brinton McClellan and Robert E. Lee 
respectively, met to discuss articles for a cartel or exchange agreement.  
Despite having been notified by President Lincoln six days earlier to avoid any 
formal type of verbal recognition to the Confederacy (Lincoln still arguing his 
case of a municipal war) in the provisions, Dix was given plenary power to draw 
up provisions.  The Dix-Hill agreement was based upon the cartel of 1813 drawn up 
between the United States and Great Britain.  It was ratified four days later on 
July 22, 1862.  See O.R., Ser. 2, Vol. 4, 210, 239, 266-68; for effect of 
 6
to validate its parole and exchange of the Port Hudson and Vicksburg prisoners; 
the desire of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and General Ulysses S. Grant to curb 
desertion and bounty jumping by federal soldiers; and most importantly, Grant’s 
belief that the most expeditious way to relieve all inhumane suffering and 
treatment was to end the war.  The northern policy change, then, was in keeping 
with Grant’s desires to end the war, one he called “a military necessity.”10 
Secretary Stanton utilized the stoppage of the exchange, moreover, to 
inaugurate a renewed prison literature campaign on the national level to help 
deflect growing criticism from Washington onto Richmond.  Stanton wanted to 
convince northerners, and the rest of the world, that the southern confederacy 
had erected and maintained a “deliberate system of savage and barbarous treatment 
and starvation” 11 of northern prisoners.  He prodded the U.S. House Committee on 
the Conduct and Expenditures of the War as well as aid societies like the United 
States Sanitary Commission and Christian Commissions to make public their 
interviews with former prisoners, audits of camps, and abstracts of their 
official reports and findings.12     
  By the early summer of 1864, the U.S. House committee finished its 
investigation of ex-prisoners from an Annapolis hospital and made its official 
report.  The report, containing thirty pages and eight photographs, summarized 
the testimony of prisoners held in Richmond’s Libby Prison and on nearby Belle 
Isle on the James River in Virginia.  It was quickly distributed throughout the 
north among the various presses.  The House committee said that the “evidence 
proves, beyond all matter of doubt . . . that the inhumane practices . . . are 
the result of the determination on the part of the rebel authorities to reduce 
our soldiers in their power, by privation of food and clothing, and by 
exposure.”13  Secretary of War Stanton added fuel to the report when he said, “The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
published accounts and cartel agreement see New York Times, July 13, 24, 1862; 
for periods of confinement see Speer Portals to Hell, xiv  
     10 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VII, 605-607; John Y. Simon, Ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. 
Grant, 24 Vols. (Carbondale, Illinois, 1967-1988), Vol. XIII, 158, 180, 323.    
     11 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VII, 110-111, 115. 
     12 U.S. House of Representatives, 38th Congress, 1st Session, Report Number 67, 4-5 
(hereinafter cited as Report No. 67); Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 60. 
     13 Report No. 67, 2-4. 
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enormity of the crime committed by the rebels towards our prisoners for the last 
several months is not known or realized by our people . . . [as there] appears to 
have been a deliberate system of savage and barbarous treatment and starvation.”14  
Thus heading into the fall elections of 1864, Stanton’s incendiary rhetoric, 
combined with the report of the House Committee on the Conduct and Expenditures 
of the War, served as the spark that helped inflame the northern populous behind 
the Union war effort and President Lincoln’s reelection bid.  Northerners seemed 
to accept that the war must continue, and thus bolstered the decidedly Republican 
policy objectives. 
In a continued effort to make northern audiences believe that southerners 
were brutes, the United States Sanitary Commission also investigated the 
conditions of prisoners who had been held by the Confederacy in Richmond’s Libby 
and Belle Isle prisons.  The Sanitary Commission corroborated the U.S. House 
report by claiming that they too witnessed “diseased and dying [men] . . . [that 
were] physically ruined for life.”15  The Sanitation Commission concluded its 
findings with the veiled charge that much suffering might have been alleviated by 
Confederate authorities despite shortages of supplies in the Confederacy’s 
capital.  The “dreadful condition of things,” it continued, “might be 
attributable to even other causes than the possible destitution of the rebel 
government.”16  By “other causes,” the commission was referring to the South’s 
alleged “spirit of cruelty, inhumanity, and interested malice.”17 
Following Lincoln’s reelection and the reports of the U.S. House on the 
Conduct of the War and U.S. Sanitary Commission, the South had heard and remained 
silent long enough.  On March 3, 1865 the Confederate Congress responded to the 
allegations.  In a report issued by a joint committee of Confederate senators and 
representatives, the South, bridling at the North’s hypocrisy regarding prison 
camps, stated their disdain for the recent publications circulating throughout 
                                                 
     14 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VII, 110-111, 115. 
     15 U.S. Sanitation Commission, Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of United 
States Officers and Soldiers While Prisoners of War of Rebel Authorities. Being 
Report of a Commission of Inquiry, Appointed by the United States Sanitary 
Commission (Philadelphia, Penns., 1864), 21.   
     16 Ibid., 92-95. 
     17 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VII, 338. 
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the North as well as the mainland of Europe.  It read, “This report is rendered 
especially important by reason of persistent efforts lately made by the 
Government of the United States, and by associations and individuals connected or 
co-operating with it, to asperse the honor of the Confederate authorities and to 
charge them with deliberate and willful cruelty to prisoners of war.”18 
The Confederate joint committee’s report countered the charges laid against 
them by the U.S. House and Sanitary Commission by leveling charges of their own.  
The southern joint committee claimed that northern prisoners “were not in a worse 
state than were the Confederate prisoners [who] returned from northern hospitals 
and prisons.”  Moreover, and more importantly, they berated the North for the 
deplorable state of its prison camps given the abundance of supplies throughout 
the federal army and the northern nation at large.  The joint committee, with a 
measure of sarcasm and irritation, added that “the humanity and superior 
management [which have been] subjects of special boasting by the U.S. Sanitation” 
were completely false and never applied to southern prisoners while captive in 
the north.19   
 The Confederate joint committee also conducted several interviews with its 
soldiers and surgeons who had been held captive in the north.  One account, given 
by an assistant surgeon, stated that, “I have seen many of our prisoners returned 
from the North who were nothing but skin and bones.”  Another surgeon added, “I 
have never seen such a set of men in worse condition.  They were so enfeebled and 
emaciated that we lifted them like little children.  Many of them were like 
living skeletons.”20  The report went on refute and counter, point by point, the 
statements made by the U.S. House Committee’s report.  Moreover, the Confederate 
                                                 
     18  R.A. Brock, Ed., The Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 Vols., 1876-1959 
(Millwood, New York, 1977), Vol. 1, No. 3, 113-114, 132-153, (hereinafter cited 
as SHSP); O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VIII, 338. It should be noted that two of the eight 
photos included in the original reports issued by the U.S. House and Sanitary 
Commission’s reports were of men who died before the Sanitary Committee visited 
Annapolis, and a third photo was of a soldier who was from a military field 
hospital thus lending credence to the South’s frustrated response and subsequent 
cry of northern disingenuousness. For a full explanation see Hesseltine, Civil 
War Prisons, 69-113. 
     19 SHSP, Vol. 1, No. 4, 225; Vol. 3, No. 4, 197-214; O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VIII, 
341. 
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representatives sought to depict the United States Sanitation Commission as a 
mere instrument of propaganda for the Lincoln administration.21  
 When the war concluded in 1865, Northern and Southern ex-prisoners began to 
compile a list of complaints relative to their treatment while held in captivity.  
Veterans who had successfully passed through the valley of the enemy’s shadow 
complained about theft, compatriots being shot, poorly equipped and staffed 
hospitals, inadequate or nonexistent medical supplies, a lack of shelter and poor 
sanitation, inconsistent supply and quality of foodstuffs, cruelty and harshness 
of prison guards, and most widely documented, the stoppage of the exchange.  
Postbellum polemicists, therefore, had a plethora of complaints, relative to the 
mistreatment of prisoners, with which to wave the bloody shirt and to advance 
their public and at times private agendas.22 
 From 1865 to the outset of American involvement in World War One, veterans 
and politicians utilized the prisoner-of-war system to support disability claims 
on their applications for pension, and to psychologically assuage their mental 
debilitation through the writing of papers and pamphlets.  Though some veterans’ 
accounts of prison life and psychological anguish were truly reflective of the 
conditions within the camps, as substantiated by northern and southern veteran’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
     20 Ibid., 340.  
     21 Confederate Imprints, 1861-1865. Based on Marjorie Lyle Crandall, Confederate 
imprints, a checklist, 1955, and Richard B. Harwell, More Confederate Imprints, 
1957 (New Haven, Conn., Research Publications, 1974), 144 reels. Reel 2:43; O.R., 
Ser. II, Vol. VIII, 340-341.     
     22 While too numerous to list in the space provided see the following less 
utilized early war primary publications: For Northern accounts on conditions and 
psychological effects, Lieutenant William C. Harris, Prison Life in a Tobacco 
Warehouse in Richmond (Philadelphia, 1862), passim; William H. Jeffrey, Richmond 
Prisons 1861-1862 (Vermont, Connecticut, 1940), 19, 98-115; William H. Merrill, 
Five Months in Rebeldom; or Notes from the Diary of a Bull Run Prisoner ay 
Richmond (Rochester, New York, 1862). For Southern accounts see, John J. Dunkle 
[Fritz Fuzzlebug pseudonym], Prison Life During the Rebellion (Singer Glen, 
Virginia, 1869), Knauss, The Story of Camp Chase, 3-15; Joe Barbiere, Scraps from 
the Prison Table at Camp Chase and Johnson’s Island (Doylestown, Pennsylvania, 
1868), 103-106, 131; Bartlett Malone, Whipt em’ Everytime (Jackson, Tenn., 1960) 
45-48; Martha Buck, “A Louisiana Prisoner-of-War on Johnson’s Island, 1863-1865,” 
Louisiana History 4(1963), 236. See also O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III, 152-156, 213, 
221-224, 238-241, 379, 498-500, 604-605, 694, 730-751, and Ser. II, Vol. IV, 112-
116, 136, 167-183 for some of the more detailed pages of reports.      
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accounts, many reflections often embellished and perverted the reality of their 
imprisonment and the prison system as a whole.  What is important to remember is 
that many believed that their condition had been part of a deliberate scheme by a 
barbarous enemy to reduce their ranks, rather than a mere oversight or 
consequence of war.  The reality of the prison system and poor conditions within 
the camps, however, was that both sides lacked a standardized system of 
administration.  Because of the lack of standardization, the experiences and 
conditions faced by individual prisoners varied with the geographic location of 
the camp, composition of the guards, and overall management.23 
 The lack of standardization was further hindered in both the North and the 
South because of disagreement between the central and state governments.  In 
early 1862 because some state prison camps, like Camp Chase near Columbus, Ohio, 
were both poorly managed and geographically placed, the Lincoln administration 
decided to provide for a formalized development of the prison camp system.24 
 On October 26, 1861 Colonel William H. Hoffman, a parolee from the United 
States Eighth Infantry in Texas, was appointed commissary-general of prisoners.  
Hoffman, a former prisoner and man with considerable legal experience, 
immediately began to implement a detailed plan of centralization.  All 
correspondence regarding the prison system was required to pass through his 
office.  Moreover, as directed by the War Department in Washington, he was to 
                                                 
     23 For a good account of the psychological effects—and the roller coaster ride of 
emotion regarding exchange—within the camps, see Joe Barbiere, Scraps from the 
Prison Table, 100-106, 125-131.  David E. Chesebrough, God Ordained This War: 
Sermons on the Sectional Crisis, 1830-1865 (Columbia, South Carolina, 1991), 127-
129. The North began to replace camp guards with paroled soldiers who thought, 
upon their surrender, that they would be sent home rather than to finish out 
their enlistments.  The South, with a dwindling number of fighting men, began to 
replace their camp guards with older men and young boys whose age and temperament 
were anything but civil and stable.  As a result, northern and southern prisoners 
were exposed to greater physical and psychological anguish because of the change.  
     24 As early as August 1861, General M.C. Meigs, quartermaster-general of the 
army, instructed then Secretary of the War Simon Cameron that a commissary-
general of prisoners would be required.  Meigs made his decision both because of 
the growing number of Confederate seaman (Lincoln referred them to as pirates 
because of the debate of de facto recognition) that had been captured, and most 
importantly, Union defeat at (First) Manassas meant the war may well last much 
longer than the preconceived ninety days.      
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establish rules for camp commandants--in accordance with international law--and 
to call for the development of a system of audits and inspections.25 
 In the autumn of 1861, the Union supported several prisons that had been 
erected haphazardly with regard to provincial departmental need and in absence of 
a centralized governing body (largely because of the aforementioned position of 
Lincoln’s administration regarding the de facto recognition of the Confederacy).  
From the concrete citadel of Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, Massachusetts to a 
confiscated medical college in St. Louis, Missouri, the Union held Confederate 
“insurgents” in poorly constructed and inadequately guarded prison camps.  For 
Hoffman, the prisons presented a clear security risk.26 
 In order to reduce the feasibility of escape because of poor geographic 
location and to limit the possibility of cavalry raids whose purpose may also be 
to aid escape, Hoffman, with the support of the quartermaster-general of the army 
General M. C. Meigs, decided to build a new military prison camp well within the 
Union’s interior.  They looked to the shores of Lake Erie near Sandusky and 
Norwalk, Ohio, and singled out the islands of Put-in-Bay.  Following inspection 
of the islands, Hoffman reported that Johnson’s Island afforded the most suitable 
site.  The island, located well over a mile out in the bay, was easily accessible 
and maintainable from a sizable railhead located in nearby Sandusky.27          
 Following the U.S. War Department’s review of the report, Hoffman received 
authorization to go ahead with the construction of the prison on Johnson’s 
Island.  Under orders and in accordance to Hoffman’s direction, the camp would 
house approximately a thousand prisoners at a time, and was to be constructed as 
parsimoniously as possible.  Hoffman’s governance and capital spending regarding 
construction, as well as the prison camp system at large, therefore, would follow 
the same logic of cost considerations over comfort levels.28  
                                                 
     25 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III, 48; Speer, Portals, 11. 
     26 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. I, 151; Ibid., Ser. II, Vol. III 46-47, 50-53, 136; It 
should also be noted that because the number of prisoners held was negligible, 
humanitarian concerns factored little into policy directives.  After Confederate- 
held Fort Donelson surrenders in early 1862, however, policy will evolve with the 
increased number of captives and size of prison populations.   
     27 Hesseltine, Prisons, 37-38; O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III, 54-58. 
     28 Ibid., Ser. II, Vol. III, 8, 49, 54-58, 122-123. 
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In February 1862, the prison camp on Johnson’s Island was completed.  The 
question of control, however, met with varying degrees of friction from the 
governor of Ohio, Richard Tod.  Although aware that the fort at Johnson’s Island 
had been fully funded from federal coffers, Governor Tod insisted that he be 
allowed to appoint Ohio volunteers as guards and to establish regulations for 
governance of the camp.  Hoffman responded to Tod’s request with disgust and 
dismay.  With respect to his centralized plan, he argued that because prisoners 
were to be sent to pre-determined camps according to their appropriate rank,29 
that any deviation from the newly established standard of regulations and control 
would lead to potential problems of mismanagement or adjustment of newly 
transferred prisoners--new prisoners like the thousands recently captured after 
the fall of Fort Donelson.30 
Hoffman specifically used Camp Chase, under Tod’s and the State of Ohio’s 
supervision, as an example of mismanagement and as a way to publicly spar with 
and humiliate Governor Tod’s administration in Columbus.  The Confederate 
officers that were held at Camp Chase were free to leave the prison compound and 
to go into the town of Columbus each day as long as they gave their word as 
gentlemen that they would return within a twenty-four hour period.  Captured 
Confederate officers, then, could readily be seen “suffering” in Columbus’ finest 
hotels and brothels, many accompanied by their slaves.  The complete lack of 
control displayed at Camp Chase, along with the continued complaints from the 
citizens of Columbus, helped to bring about total Federal control of all 
prisoners within the state (and the several states).  Thus for the Confederate 
officers at Camp Chase, the party, quite literally, was over.31                
While the Union struggled to establish a unified and coherent prison camp 
policy, the South also met with difficulties in its development of a system.  On 
                                                 
     29 Officers were to be separated from enlisted men. 
     30 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III 427.  The surrender of Fort Donelson thrust 
approximately twelve thousand Confederate troops into a nascent prison system 
designed for far fewer prisoners, and thus added to the problems Hoffman faced in 
gaining centralized control.  It is also the site that Grant earned his nom de 
guerre “Unconditional Surrender” Grant. 
     31 Ibid., 326-327, 427-429; William H. Knauss, The Story of Camp Chase, 22-63, 
315. 
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May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress ratified an act regarding treatment of 
prisoners-of-war.  Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ administration, unlike 
it counterpart, pushed for the rapid development of an effective prison camp 
system to further bolster its desire for international recognition, de facto, de 
jure, or otherwise.32 
Less than a month later in June, 1861 and with a continued proactive view 
toward the development of the prison camp system, Confederate Secretary of War 
Leroy Walker approached the North Carolina’s governor’s office with the request 
of securing a new prison site.33  Walker, under pressure from the people of 
Richmond who clamored for the removal of “Yankee” prisoners, was relieved when he 
was notified that North Carolina would be willing to recommend a suitable site 
once located.  North Carolina authorities quickly presented Salisbury.  Located 
in the southwestern corner of North Carolina and presumably well into the 
Confederacy’s interior, Salisbury served as major railroad hub for points “north, 
south, and west” for ease of transportation.34 
The recommendation of Salisbury, however, came at a price.  Henry Toole 
Clarke, serving as Governor ex oficio following the passing of Governor John 
Willis Ellis, insisted that North Carolina be allowed to “furnish proper troops 
for guard purposes.”  Moreover, and rather surreptitiously, Clarke recommended 
that the purchase of a cotton factory in Salisbury, which could house nearly two 
thousand prisoners, “be withheld from the public until after the purchase.”  
Moreover, Clarke went on to imply that the factory could be sold for at least 
double its purchase price “when the war is over.”35 
Walker was upset by the arrogant tone of Clarke’s letter, his material-
minded rhetoric, and his insinuation that only troops from North Carolina were 
capable of guarding the camp.  Over the subsequent months, Walker would spar with 
Clarke over various legal matters including unapproved prisoner exchanges. 
Because North Carolina pursued the exchanges, Walker reasoned, the state’s 
                                                 
  32Confederate Imprints, Reel 2:43.    
     33 Governor John Willis Ellis had recently passed away and the affairs were 
handled by Henry Toole Clarke as Governor ex oficio. 
     34 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III, 681-682.  Governor Ellis would pass away in July, 
1861 of poor health. 
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actions sought to undermine the Confederate government’s central control and thus 
left open the door for confusion and mismanagement.  Upon receiving news that 
Confederate bonds could be sold to cover the cost of construction and with the 
influx of prisoners following the Confederate victory at the First Battle of 
Manassas, however, Walker softened.  He had little choice but to concede to 
Clarke’s wishes.  
Jefferson Davis too found himself embroiled in debate with Virginia’s 
Governor John Letcher.  Letcher maintained that captured Union officers should be 
surrendered to his commonwealth for trial.  They were to be tried, he believed, 
for inciting slave insurrection.   Davis, like the rest of the country, well 
understood from the trial of John Brown what a guilty verdict in Virginia would 
most probably bring for Northern officers--death by hanging--and thus worked to 
neutralize Letcher’s position for obvious diplomatic purposes.  Despite the 
resolution of Letcher’s demands, however, Davis would ultimately win the debate.  
In March 1863 outright control of prisoners was turned over to the central 
authorities in Richmond.   
The disagreements, even if largely rhetorical, would be but a few examples 
of the several well-documented battles between Davis’ administration and the 
various state governors like Francis Pickens, Zebulon Vance, Joseph Brown, and 
John Letcher.  They were, in the end, debates that delayed action and that 
ultimately impacted the collective memories of those officers and soldiers who 
were kept in a constant state of flux.36  
     Surprisingly, and counter to much of the postwar pejorative prose, some 
veterans, like those Confederate officers imprisoned at Camp Chase, portrayed the 
prison experience in a different light.  “It is very pleasant today,” wrote one 
North Carolinian in 1864.  “We had pical [pickle] Pork for breakfast this morning 
and for dinner we had Been [bean] Soop.”37  Other accounts, though not nearly as 
numerous as those describing the darker side of camp life, suggested that 
prisoners were afforded access to goods sold by sutlers and that meals were 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
     35 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III, 682. 
     36 Ibid., Ser. II, Vol. IV, 701-702, 828-829, 849-850.  The Dix-Hill cartel 
helped aid Davis’ argument for central control of prisoners, especially officers.   
     37 Bartlett Y. Malone, Whipt em’ Everytime, 45-48. 
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provided by local citizens.  Colonel William Ward of the 9th Tennessee Cavalry 
reported that he was able to purchase “two different calico shirts at $2 each”38 
while imprisoned in Alton, Illinois.  A Chaplain White from the Rhode Island 
Heavy Artillery held in North Carolina said, “We went with a guard to a house 
nearby, and which was evidently the property of a well-to-do family.  They 
treated us kindly.  They were rebels, and no mistake.”39            
 Despite a fairly large body of positive rhetoric regarding the treatment of 
soldiers,40 which seems to suggest that prison perception was truly a case by case 
experience, the politicians paid them little lip service following the war.  
Preachers too played on the extraordinary circumstances of the system and spoke 
to the sensational rather than the real.  Additionally, the press refused to 
circulate them as widely as their “darker” counterparts.  Instead, the 
politicians, the press, and at times the preachers, chose to revisit the 
atrocities of the prison camps at the hands of a “barbarous murderer” in an 
effort to revitalize sectional animosity and to increase political capital as 
well as rates of subscription.  In short, the dark side sold.41 
 While being subjected to the postwar rhetoric of imprisonment, northern and 
southern citizens attempted to reconcile the more widely circulated accounts of 
demoralization, demise, and death within the context of their individually 
professed Christian principles like forgiveness.  The assassination of President 
Lincoln, however, hardened the hearts of northerners more fully.  With Lincoln’s 
assassination, they were less willing to turn the other cheek toward the southern 
                                                 
     38 Quoted in Robert E. Denney, Civil War Prisons and Escapes (New York, 1993), 
184. 
     39 Ibid., 213. 
     40 Only a few examples have been given for space considerations.  It should be 
noted, however, that many of the diaries, whether sympathetic to or totally 
against the system as a whole, are mostly poor sources because the intention of 
the authors is an unknown, and because many are historically inaccurate.    
     41 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 175-180; Hesseltine, Propaganda, 56.  Also see 
Nancy A. Roberts, “The Aftermath of Civil War Prisons and Their Dead.” 
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populace.  The tragedy played out at Ford’s Theater only seemed to confirm the 
denunciatory sentiment of the northern prisoners, politicians, and polemicists.42 
 From the first published accounts in 1862 and through the 1880s, veterans 
regularly contributed their battle and prison memories to magazines and 
newspapers thus increasing circulations.  The accounts, however, often played to 
the sensational and, at times, mirrored the ever-popular dime novels.  Preachers 
too exacerbated the festering animosity between sections shortly after the war.  
In one postbellum sermon, a northern preacher excoriated Confederate authorities 
when he said, “We see the unmitigated turpitude [of the South].. . . It is the 
same spirit . . . that starved our unhappy prisoners at Andersonville—that 
butchered our men in cold blood at Fort Pillow—that froze our veterans to death 
on Belle Island [Isle] . . . [and] that crowded our officers in the damp dungeons 
of Richmond.”43  The partisan nature of some publishers and preachers, therefore, 
fanned the embers within the political chambers that, in turn, weld together 
northern sentiment against a common enemy, the South.44  
 In 1869, the political inferno fully engulfed both sections of the country 
following the release of House Report No. 45.  The published report was the 
byproduct of a committee appointed by the U.S. House of Representatives to 
investigate the treatment of prisoners of war.  After interviewing over three 
thousand former prisoners, the committee concluded that the treatment had been 
the result of “slavery, treason, and rebellion.”  Moreover the report recorded 
that the alleged abominable treatment of Union prisoners provided a perverse 
example “to which the eyes of future generations revert with shame.”45 
                                                 
     42 Ibid. Especially section on recriminations.  See also James O. Henry, “The 
United States Christian Commission in the Civil War,” Civil War History 6(1960), 
374-388. 
     43 Chester F. Dunham, The Attitude of the Northern Clergy Toward the South 1860-
1865 (Philadelphia, 1974), 194-195. 
     44 David B. Chesebrough, God Ordained This War: Sermons on the Sectional Crisis, 
1830-1865 (Columbia, South Carolina, 1991), 127-140; Kathleen Diffley, Where My 
Heart is Turning Ever: Civil War Stories and Constitutional Reform, 1861-1876 
(Athens, Georgia, 1992), xii-xxxiv; Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 
1877?” The Journal of American History 60(1973), 70, 75. 
     45 U.S. Congress, Report of Treatment of Prisoners of War and Union Citizens, 40th 
Congress, 3rd Session, 1869, 253-258 (hereinafter cited as Report No. 45). 
 17
 Confederate veterans and leaders responded to Report No. 45 as they had to 
all previous reports from House committees and “federally-backed” commissions 
like the United States Sanitation and Christian Commissions.  They blamed United 
States policy and its decision-makers.  Southern leaders never denied the charge 
that Union soldiers suffered in their prison camps.  What they did contest, 
however, were the allegations of intentional mistreatment and, most importantly, 
that the South was solely to blame for all the prisoners’ privations.  Jefferson 
Davis blamed the Lincoln administration’s decision to end the exchange as it had 
been “one of the established usages in war between civilized nations.”46  Further, 
he argued that the withholding of medicines as contraband of war prevented 
supplies from reaching hospitals inside southern prison camps thus increasing the 
number of Union casualties.  For Davis, the root cause of all of the humanitarian 
misfortune was the end of the exchange.47 
 Davis’ argument regarding the misrepresentation of intentional mistreatment 
by the South found support in the U.S. War Department records concerning the 
number of prisoners and deaths within the prison camps.  During the war the 
Confederacy held 270,000 Union prisoners of which 22,000 lost their lives.  
Conversely the North held 220,000 Confederate prisoners of which 26,000 perished.  
For Davis and Confederate veterans, the U.S. War Department numbers painted a 
horrific picture of reality; the reality that more Confederate soldiers died in 
Union camps even though “in every material respect . . . the North held greatly 
the advantage.”48  
 In 1878, the inflammatory sectional rhetoric regarding prison camps reached 
its pinnacle.  A debate in the House of Representatives over the pending Amnesty 
Bill sounded the assembly call for both political parties and once again stirred 
the smoldering ashes of animosity between sections of the country.  The Amnesty 
                                                 
     46 Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2 Vols. (New 
York, 1881), Vol. I, 581; SHSP, Vol. 1, No. 3, 113-132.  
     47 Stewart Brooks, Civil War Medicine (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1966), 13-14.  
While the U.S. did withhold medicinal products, it, like the exchange, was deemed 
a “military necessity” in order to end the war.  Moreover, it was believed that 
any medical products sent south would have been used for Confederate battle 
wounds and not Union prisoners of war.  
     48 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VIII, 970-972, 990-1004. 
 18
Bill offered the restoration of unlimited political rights to all who had 
previously held public office in the United States, but had given service to the 
Confederacy during the war.  The debate began when presidential hopeful James G. 
Blaine of Maine sought to amend the bill by specifically excluding Jefferson 
Davis.  Blaine argued for exclusion on the grounds that the former Confederate 
commander-in-chief “was the author [who] knowingly, deliberately, guiltily, and 
willfully . . . [orchestrated] the gigantic murders and crimes at Andersonville 
[prison].”49  Moreover, Blaine repeated the northern claim in Report No. 45 that 
Confederate prisoners had been treated fairly, and that all acts of atrocities 
had occurred south of the Mason-Dixon Line.50          
 In response to Blaine’s assault on Davis and the South at large, 
Representative Benjamin Hill of Georgia voiced his dismay at the purely political 
rhetoric of Blaine and some Republicans, “We had well hoped that the country had 
suffered long enough from feuds . . . [and] from inflamed passions . . . [only to 
see] the passions from which all were hushing shall be re-inflamed.”51  Benjamin 
Hill, like Davis and southern veterans had often repeated before him, argued that 
northern policy was responsible for the suffering.  “Every horror,” Hill 
declared, “grew out of the necessities of occasion.”  Moreover, those 
“necessities were cast upon the confederacy by the war policy of the other 
side.”52  
 Hill’s rebuttal, however, showed that the deep sectional wounds caused by 
the war were healing.  He refused to place blame, as some southerners had in the 
past, on any one individual, committee, or commission.  Rather, in comparing the 
death tolls, northern and southern, as reported by the U.S. War Department, he 
stated that the “horrors are inseparable, many of them and most of them resulting 
from a state of war.” Hill well understood Blaine’s personal presidential 
aspirations and thus his desire to drive a wedge between northern and southern 
Democrats in an attempt to regain Republican control of the House.  “The 
                                                 
     49 U.S. Congress, 44th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record (January 10-13, 
1876), Vol. 4, 324. 
     50 Ibid., 325. For an outpouring of comments regarding Blaine’s comments see 
SHSP, Vol. 1, No. 3, 113-132. 
     51 Ibid., 345. 
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gentleman from Maine has so ostentatiously paraded, for obvious partisan purpose 
of exciting upon this floor a bitter sectional discussion, from which his party, 
and perhaps himself, may be the beneficiary.”53    
Hill’s oration, while detailed, reasoned, and strong, could do little to 
save the Democratic-sponsored Amnesty Bill.  The measure would fail.  Yet even 
though the measure failed and the Hill-Blaine debate served to prolong the 
generation-long argument over mistreatment of prisoners-of-war, Hill’s refusal to 
point a sectional finger at any one entity showed that the disagreement had 
evolved to one that once again transcended sectional lines to the more 
traditional political party lines.  The hands of time, therefore, had begun to 
heal the wounds of war.54    
In the end, postbellum remembrance of the American Civil War prison system, 
much like the memories of those who were held within the camps, varied from 
inmate to inmate.  Because each individual’s perception of the system differed, 
the prisoners’ collective memory formed a patchwork of partisan perception; a 
series of still-frame photographs that formed an irrational and illogical collage 
open to interpretation, and at times, manipulation.  Regardless of experience or 
perception, however, most recollections were driven by a desire for some degree 
of indemnification--whether psychological, political, or financial--for having 
been subjected and sacrificed to the machinations of wartime policy and postwar 
politics.  
While the purpose of this paper has been to build a bridge in the gap of the 
present American Civil War prisoner-or-war system historiography by focusing on 
an institutional perspective to the problem, it clearly remains a cursory study 
at best.  Further elucidation awaits the innovation and erudition of some future 
author who can provide a more complete, detailed account; further work that also 
suggests that the study of the American Civil War remains very much alive.     
 
     52 Ibid., 347-348. 
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     54 Ibid., 350-353. 
